Further Union Decline in Germany and Britain † This paper presents the first comparative analysis of the decline in collective bargaining in two European countries where that decline has been most pronounced. Using workplace-level data and a common model, we present decompositions of changes in collective bargaining and worker representation in the private sector in Germany and Britain over the period 1998-2004. In both countries within-effects dominate compositional changes as the source of the recent decline in unionism. Overall, the decline in collective bargaining is more pronounced in Britain than in Germany, thus continuing a trend apparent since the 1980s. Although workplace characteristics differ markedly across the two countries, assuming counterfactual values of these characteristics makes little difference to unionization levels. Expressed differently, the German dummy looms large.
Introduction
Recent years have witnessed a decline in unionism in Western Europe (see Blanchflower, 2007; Ebbinghaus and Visser, 1999; Visser, 2003 Visser, , 2006 . The decline has not been uniform but has instead been concentrated in the larger countries, particularly Britain, Germany, and Italy. In the present paper, we take advantage of unique comparable workplace data to examine developments in two of these countries, Germany and Britain.
We contribute to the existing literature which has focused almost entirely on union density using household data, by exploring factors behind the demise of unionization at workplace level. In a further departure from conventional practice, we extend our definition of plant 'representation' to encompass the workplace coverage of works councils in Germany and joint consultative committees in Britain. We deploy a common model of the determinants of collective bargaining/workplace representation and undertake a shift-share analysis of observed changes in the outcome indicators both across time and vertically (i.e. at a single point in time).
The goal is to determine the contribution of compositional factors on the one hand and behavioural or within-group factors on the other to the decline in unionization.
Although similar such decompositions based on union density have been undertaken for individual countries, ours is the first such comparative exercise. And apart from one other (single-country) study it is the first to consider union recognition rates at plant level rather than on aggregations based on the union status of individuals. Moreover, unlike that study it covers a larger slice of the labour force, namely workplaces with 10 or more employees rather than 25 or more employees. And, as we have noted, our study is further distinguished by reason of its comparative framework and range, proceeding as it does beyond union recognition to encompass not only collective bargaining coverage but also other forms of workplace representation.
Background
The decline in unionism in Britain long preceded our sample period. Writing at the beginning of this decade, and reflecting on the findings of a study tracking employment relations over the previous two decades, Millward, Bryson, and Forth (2000: 234) commented: "The system of collective relations, based on the shared values of the legitimacy of representation by independent trade unions and of joint regulation, crumbled … to such an extent that it no longer represents a dominant model." The facts in aggregate were these: in 1979 some 73 percent of workers were union members and by 1999 this had fallen to 28 percent; in 1980 about 70 percent of establishments recognized unions for collective bargaining purposes, declining to less than 45 percent by the mid-1990s (Machin, 2000) . These results were driven by developments in the private sector, and above all in manufacturing.
Commentators were now to refer to unions as "hollow shells" (Hyman, 1997; Brown et al., 1998; Millward, Bryson, and Forth, 2000) . Their resulting parlous state severely impacted the ability of British unions to service current members' interests, let alone organize parts of the non-union sector (Willman and Bryson, 2009 ). The tendency was therefore for new workplaces and new entrants to the labour force to be 'born' non-union (Machin, 2000; Willman, Bryson, and Gomez, 2007) , resulting in a rise in the proportion of all employees in the labour force who had never been union members. Intriguingly, the 'never-membership' phenomenon was even apparent in organized workplaces (Bryson and Gomez, 2005) . Finally, British unions had focused their organizing activity at workplace or organizational level such that by the start of our sample period sectoral bargaining was already a spent force outside of the public sector (Brown, Bryson, and Forth, 2009: 34) .
Historically, sectoral bargaining (strictly, regional industry-wide bargaining) has been the key form of collective bargaining in Germany, covering some 90 percent of all employees. As Schnabel, Zagelmayer, and Kohaut (2006: 168) note, things first began to change in the early 1970s with the emergence of what they term "qualitative bargaining policy," namely sectoral agreements that sought to accommodate improvements in working life and the protection of employees against dislocations caused by rationalization and technical change. Such provisions were to be implemented at local level. Thence, in the 1990s, under the pressures of globalization, high unemployment, and unification, all aspects of the system of collective bargaining are widely characterized in the German literature as having being subject to more or less serious quantitative change. The manifestations of this erosion included a rising trend of firm resignations from employers' associations (Silvia and Schroeder, 2007) , a rapid decline in union density (Addison, Schnabel, and Wagner, 2007) , and shrinking collective bargaining coverage (Kohaut and Schnabel, 2003) . Moreover, the coverage of that other pillar of the German dual system -the works council (see below) -was also subject to some erosion (Hassel, 1999) . In response to these challenges, German collective bargaining was decentralizing. One aspect of this development was the growth in company agreements as many firms dropped out of the centralized system.
Another was the growth of decentralization in sectoral agreements -first through the device of 'opening clauses' that allowed firms more flexibility via locally negotiated adjustments to centrally agreed working time and wages, and latterly through other contractual innovations including 'pacts for employment and competitiveness ' (Addison et al., 2009 ). Such organized decentralization may have slowed the flight from sectoral collective bargaining to firm-level bargaining and individual bargaining. Be that as it may, the stylized facts were these: from 1990 to 1997 the number of company agreements rose from 2,100 to 3,300 in western Germany (and from 2,700 to 5,000 in the whole of Germany) while the percentage of employees in western Germany who were covered by collective (sectoral) agreements fell from 83.1 (72.2) percent in 1995 to 75 (67.8) percent in 1998 (Hassel, 1999) .
The decline in union density has been fairly extensively charted in Britain, somewhat less so in Germany given the longer-standing decline in the former nation.
One early hallmark of the British analysis was the attempt to decompose the decline in unionization into its constituent parts. For the decade of the 1980s (strictly 1983-1989) Green (1992) concludes that the combined effect of compositional factors to the observed decline in private-sector union density from 49.6 to 38.6 percent was 30 percent, which is taken by the author to be an upper-bound estimate since compositional changes are not independent of public policy or macroeconomic conditions. Investigating the 16 percentage point fall in private-sector union density over the period 1983 -2001 , Bryson and Gomez (2005 find that just one percentage point is explained by an increase in the number of workers who ceased being union members. The remainder is due to the rise in the percentage of employees who never join a trade union ("never-members"). Overall, the authors conclude that 60 percent of the 20 percentage point increase in never-membership over the period was due to compositional factors.
Just one British study considers union recognition rates at plant level rather than union density based on the union status of individuals. In a wide-ranging paper focusing on the effects of union decline on various aspects of workplace performance, Blanchflower and Bryson (2009) The early literature on the determinants of union density in Germany indicated that the propensity for union membership had not changed materially over time (see, inter al., the literature review in Fitzenberger, Kohn, and Wang, 2006) . However, two more recent contributions challenge the implication that the decline in union density in that country has mainly been driven by composition effects. Using data from three cross A study by Fitzenberger, Kohn, and Wang (2006) using data from six (four) waves of the German Socio-Economic Panel for western (eastern) Germany estimates individual membership functions via a correlated random effects probit model. As far as the authors' decompositions are concerned, the coefficients' effect dominates throughout. The characteristics' effects explain under one-third of the 6 percentage point decline in union density in western Germany between 1993 and 2003, and under one-fifth of the 19 percentage point decline in eastern Germany over the same interval.
The role of characteristics versus coefficients is also evaluated in terms of east-west comparisons at the start and end of the period. In 1993 when union density in the east exceeded that in the west by 11 percentage points, the composition of the west German labour force actually favored higher density (by 5 percentage points). Accordingly, the higher density in the east resulted from a 16 percentage point difference in coefficients; that is, for given characteristics, east Germans were at this time more strongly unionized than their western counterparts. But by 2003 union density in the east had fallen some 2 percentage points below that of the west. Since the composition of the labour force in the west still favored higher density, it follows that the coefficients effect had become more similar in the two halves of the country. On balance, therefore, the emerging consensus of the recent German literature is that changes in the composition of the workforce have played a minor role in the decline in union density.
We analyze the decline in private-sector collective bargaining in Britain and Germany. Our unit of analysis throughout is the establishment rather than aggregations 
Data
The German data are taken from the IAB Establishment Panel. The Panel is based on a stratified random sample of the plants 2 -the strata are currently defined over 17 industries and 10 employment size categories -from the population of all establishments with at least one employee covered by social insurance (see Fischer et al., 2009 (Filters were applied to the German data to provide a comparable sample, including the public sector and size restrictions.)
All independent variables are collected in face-to-face interviews with the senior manager responsible for employment relations on a day-to-day basis. The response rate was 80 percent in 1998 and 65 percent in 2004. As in the German case, we apply sample weights so that our analyses are nationally representative of private-sector workplaces in Britain with 10 or more employees (For full details of the two surveys, see Chaplin et al., 2005; Airey et al., 1999.) Most of the variables used in our analysis are self-explanatory, but two of them deserve some additional explanation. First, the definition of a 'leading region' in Britain is London and the South East of England, whereas for Germany it is simply western Germany. Second, the 'proportion of skilled workers' in Britain is based on the proportion of employees in the workplace in skilled occupations, defined as those in managerial, professional, technical, clerical, and skilled craft occupations. For Germany, the definition comprises skilled manual workers together with employees in jobs requiring a vocational qualification or comparable training on the job or relevant professional experience, and those in jobs requiring a university degree or higher education.
The German establishment panel identifies whether or not the establishment is bound by an industry-wide agreement, a company agreement concluded by the establishment and the trade unions, or no collective agreement at all. 3 The British data contain two measures of collective bargaining. The first is based on whether there is an agreement, be it at workplace, organization or sectoral level, to recognize one or more unions to bargain over terms and conditions for employees at the surveyed workplace. It is notable that the incidence of collective bargaining is higher using the former 'union recognition' measure than the alternative 'any collective agreement' derived from the occupation-specific tranche of questions (see Table 1 below). This may be because the latter is interpreted by respondents as active collective bargaining during the year of the survey, whereas union recognition may also include workplaces where an agreement to negotiate over wages is in place, but where no actual bargaining occurred in the survey year, either because the pay agreement is not due for renewal in that year or because the agreement is dormant (Kersley et al., 2006; Millward, Bryson, and Forth, 2000) . To obtain a complete picture, although our focus will be upon the conventional union recognition variable, we shall supplement this discussion with an analysis of collective agreements of any type so as to consider not only the correlates of active bargaining but also how these may differ by bargaining gradient (i.e. industry-level versus establishment/organization-level agreements).
We also report results for another indicator of worker representation at the workplace, namely the presence of a joint consultative committee (JCCs). These committees are akin to works councils in Germany in terms of their responsibilities and operations, although the workplace-level JCCs we consider here do not receive the sort of statutory backing or authority enjoyed by works councils.
Modelling
Our study of union decline between, say, t 0 and t 1 is based on the standard OaxacaBlinder decomposition (or multivariate shift-share analysis) in which the outcome of interest, Y (here the collective bargaining measure relevant to the workplace), is conditional on a set of observed characteristics X . Accordingly, for a given country j (in our case, Britain and Germany), we have
The aggregate change in the outcome variable t ∆ is therefore
where y denotes the mean outcome, x the mean vector of characteristics, and b the corresponding coefficient estimates, obtained from (1) and (2) (3), we have the two-component
where the first term on the right-hand-side gives the 'explained' component, that is, the part of the observed change allocated to differences in observable characteristics (the between or compositional effect) while the second gives the 'unexplained' component (the within or behavioural effect), namely the change in the outcome occasioned by differences in the rates of return ('propen sities') from period t 0 to period t 1 .
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We are also interested in analyzing differences in outcomes across countries at a given point in time. In this case, and now denoting countries by subscripts -1 for Germany and 0 for Britain -the decomposition is given by To keep our implementation as simple as possible, we rely on linear estimates for our decompositions. Given that our outcome measures are binary variables, this procedure estimates (omitting subscripts) the familiar linear probability model:
But note that since we are mainly interested in mean values rather than the individual probability of a given establishment being covered by collective bargaining, our treatment does not entail any risk that the predicted probability of the sampling means falls outside the 0-1 range.
In our analysis we select two main outcome variables: (a) whether or not the establishment is covered by a collective agreement (or a recognized union in the case of Britain); and (b) whether or not it has a representative council (works council in the case of Germany and a workplace joint consultative committee for Britain). For completeness, and as intimated above, we shall also report the case where the dependent variable measures the presence of a firm or a sectoral collective agreement. Our explanatory variables -common to the two countries -comprise industry and establishment size dummies, measures of workforce composition (skill, gender, and working time status), foreign ownership, single versus multi-site firm status, establishment age, and region. reported in the remaining rows. Throughout the means are computed using sample weights so as to guarantee their representativeness with respect to the underlying population.
Findings
( Table 1 near here)
The incidence of collective bargaining has declined markedly in Britain and Germany (row 1), the percentage point decline being twice as large for union recognition in Britain as it is for collective bargaining in Germany (11.4 versus 5.8
percentage points). The rate of decline -measured as a percentage of collective bargaining in the base period -is one-and-a-half times faster in Britain (viz. 30 percent compared with around 20 percent in Germany). Nevertheless, levels of collective bargaining coverage remain considerably higher in Germany than in Britain throughout the period. In the British case, although the incidence of (any) collective bargaining coverage is lower than union recognition, its recorded absolute and relative decline is higher, a finding consistent with a further 'hollowing out' of union bargaining in Britain.
Sectoral bargaining predominates in Germany: multiemployer agreements are ten times more common than firm agreements. In Britain, on the other hand, sectoral bargaining appears to be an endangered species -even before the start of our sample period. Firm-level collective bargaining is considerably more stable over time than sectoral bargaining for both countries and its incidence is higher in Britain than in Germany throughout the period.
There are also substantial differences in worker representation in the two countries, as measured by works councils in Germany and joint consultative committees in Britain. Works councils are more common in Germany than workplace joint consultative committees are in Britain. Furthermore, the incidence of works councils is stable whereas joint consultative committees are in decline.
6 Table 1 also reviews the other workplace characteristics for both countries that we use in our shift-share analyses. The distribution of establishment size (as measured by number of employees), establishment age, and workforce composition (skill, gender, and hours of work), seem to be quite similar across countries. Differences are apparent with respect to foreign ownership (twice as high in Britain), and industry composition (e.g. the preponderance of the financial sector and hotels and restaurants in Britain, and the greater importance of construction in Germany). There are also sizeable differences in the importance of 'residual' sectors such as other business and services and community services in the two countries. However, the biggest difference between
Britain and Germany relates to single versus multiple establishment firms: in Germany single establishment firms ('independent' companies) constitute four-fifths of the private sector, as compared with only two-fifths in Britain.
( Tables 2a and 2b near here) in workplaces with 10-20 and 201-999 employees. In both countries the decline in the incidence of collective bargaining and union recognition is to a large extent across-the board, even if some marked 'individual' differences are apparent. Table 2b in contrast indicates that, although the frequency of works councils and joint consultative committees varies quite substantially across industries and establishment size categories, the presence of these worker representation institutions is (with a few exceptions, mostly for Britain) fairly stable over time.
( Table 3 near here) Table 3 -which forms the basis of the decomposition exercise below -presents our linear probability estimates of an establishment having a collective agreement of any type (Germany) or a recognized union (Britain). 7 The first column of the table pools the German data for 1998 and 2004. It shows that, all else constant, only the other business services, education, and health sectors evince a statistically significant lower probability of coverage than manufacturing (the reference sector), while the role of establishment size is well-determined (the larger the establishment, the greater the probability of coverage). The fourth column repeats the same pooled analysis for Britain. It indicates that utilities have a higher probability of union recognition than manufacturing, whereas wholesale and retail trade, hotels and restaurants, other business services, and community services all have a lower probability. These results hold, with a few exceptions, for the separate year regressions given in the second/third and fifth/sixth columns for Germany and Britain, respectively. Further, foreign ownership, single establishment status and establishment 'youth' decrease the probability of being covered, especially in Germany. However, no particular pattern emerges from workforce composition.
The coefficient estimate for the time dummy (2004) of -0.124 for Germany in the first column of the table is a little higher than the observed decline of 11.4
percentage points (earlier reported in Table 1 ), suggesting that the contribution of the compositional effect to change is likely to be low. Put differently, holding characteristics constant, the coefficient estimate for the time dummy implies a 12.4
percentage point decline, implying that the within-effect will tend to dominate.
In the case of Britain, the coefficient of the time dummy (-0.056) also mirrors quite closely the observed raw decline of 5.8 percentage points (see Table 1 ) in the union recognition measure over the period [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] . As in the case of Germany, therefore, the compositional effect for Britain is expected to be low as well.
Results for pooled country data are provided in the last three columns of Our multivariate shift-share analysis is summarized in panels (a) through (e) of Given that the observed coverage rate in 2004 is 51.1 percent, it follows that the decline in collective bargaining coverage in Germany is due in its entirety to a change in behaviour. (Changes in the characteristics of workplaces over the period were actually favorable toward collective bargaining.) As shown in panels (c) and (d), these results also hold for the cases of sectoral bargaining and firm-level agreements.
In Britain, the within-effect is also the major driving force in explaining the change in union recognition over time, accounting for about 80 percent of the observed decline. In the case of panels (b) through (d), that now refer to union coverage -our secondary measure of collective bargaining in Britain -the small magnitudes involved (just 10.6 percent of plants were covered by any type of collective bargaining in 2004 compared with 16.9 percent in 1998) probably mean that the precision of the estimates should be regarded with caution. Nevertheless, for this measure the within-effect plays an even larger role than for union recognition.
Panel (e) of Table 4a presents the decomposition with respect to works councils and JCCs. In the light of the strong stability of the former institution over the period (the observed percentage point change is only 0.6 percentage points over the six years), there is not much to be said about the distinct roles of compositional versus behavioural effects given the magnitudes involved. But as far as British joint consultative committees are concerned, the observed 4.4 percentage point decline in coverage is again mostly due to the within-effect.
We note parenthetically that these results are robust to model specification. In
Appendix Table 1 , we show the results of a decomposition exercise in which a 'full' model is specified for each country and are again able to point to the dominance of the within-effect, albeit with a fairly pronounced tendency for the contribution of compositional change to be higher in the case of Britain in the first and second columns.
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Neither do our results seem to be sensitive to weighting. In Appendix Table 2 we replicate Table 4a with unweighted data. Despite the fact that the unweighted figures on collective agreement coverage and union recognition are obviously higher -large establishments are over-represented in both surveys and size and coverage are positively correlated -the share of the within-effect is pretty much the same: 108.6 percent for Germany and 78.2 percent for Britain in the unweighted case, and 110.9 percent and 78.2 percent in the weighted case (see Table 4a ), respectively. Accordingly the primacy of the within-effect is undisturbed if we work with unweighted data.
( Table 4b near here)
We have noted that the gap between collective bargaining coverage between Germany and Britain is roughly 40 percentage points and that this gap does not change very much over the period. We can use our estimates to answer the question: had
British workplaces been endowed with the German characteristics would they have had the (high) German collective bargaining coverage? Table 4b shows the results of this exercise. We find that differences in the distribution of observable workplace characteristics across Germany and Britain account for around one-tenth of the disparity in collective bargaining across countries, so that roughly 90 percent is due to differences in the betas for each characteristic in the two countries. This 'unexplained' component (which is often attributed to discrimination in the gender wage gap literature) may, in this case, be attributable to employer tastes for union wage setting which are due, in part, to very different historical, political and industrial relations institutions in Germany relative to Britain. ( Table 5 are very much in line with the observed changes reported in Table 4a .
Consequently, the main results are as follows: first, in both countries workplace behaviour changes very little though time; and, second, the two countries differ substantially in their behaviour for a given set of workplace characteristics. Vulgo:
propensities by country mean everything in terms of cross-country differences in collective bargaining and worker representation.
Conclusions
In this paper we have charted the incidence of and changes in collective We have found that the decline in collective bargaining incidence in both countries is mostly due to changes in behaviour rather than to compositional effects.
This outcome is not particularly surprising since workplace characteristics have not changed that much over this relatively short time frame. Nevertheless, it is striking that the decline is apparent in virtually every type of workplace, albeit to different degrees.
There are few, if any, impregnable bastions of unionism left in these two nations.
A comparison of workplace characteristics across Germany and Britain revealed a number of substantial differences, perhaps the most important of which was the much greater incidence of single independent establishments in the former country. The lower propensity of single-establishment firms to embrace collective bargaining compared with their multi-site counterparts suggests that the gap in collective bargaining between Germany and Britain might get even bigger if such differences were accounted for. Yet, compositional differences in workplace characteristics accounted for about one-tenth of the 40 percentage point gap in collective bargaining incidence between Germany and
Britain. The rest, manifested in pooled country equations as a large coefficient estimate for the 'Germany' dummy, remains unexplained. But the British deficit is likely to capture country-level differences in history, culture and institutions, as well as some residual unobserved workplace-level factors. Interestingly, the size of the 'Germany' effect remained relatively stable over the period under investigation.
The cross-country pattern of decline in worker representation differs in one main aspect. Although works councils seemingly remain strong in Germany over the sample period, their British counterpart -the joint consultative committee -is emphatically in decline. This trend has occurred despite moves in Britain to institutionalize forms of worker representation other than union recognition, some of them inspired by European legislation on information and consultation.
Endnotes
1 For a moment-in-time analysis of the determinants of 'never membership' in German trade unions, see Schnabel and Wagner (2006) .
2 Large plants are oversampled but the sampling within each cell is random.
3 Interestingly, the German survey goes on to ask of those establishments not bound by a collective agreement whether or not they nevertheless oriented themselves toward an industry-wide collective agreement.
4.
Once the survey interviewer has established that there is a union at the workplace the manager is asked: "Is the [NAME OF UNION] recognized by management for negotiating pay and conditions for any sections of the workforce in this establishment? (INTERVIEWER: If agreements are negotiated with the union at a higher level in the organisation or by an employers association, but apply to union/staff association members here, count as recognized)."
5 We do not implement a three-component decomposition which can be derived similarly to yield
where the third term is the interaction of the composition and within-group effects. Consistent with the literature, our assumption is that the third term is neglible. Notes: For each panel, row (3) is given by x_B*b_G, while rows (4) and (5) are given by (x_G -x_B)*b_G (the between-effect) and x_B*(b_G --b_B) (the within-effect), respectively; B and G denote Britain and Germany; x denotes the observed mean characteristics; and b gives the estimated coefficients in the corresponding year. See equation (5) in the text. 0.8 -6.9
Notes: In each panel, the counterfactual coverage rate in the first and second columns is given by x_B*b_G and x_G*b_B, respectively; B and G denote Britain and Germany; x denotes the observed mean characteristics; and b gives the estimated coefficients in the corresponding year. 0 APPENDIX 
